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The special theory of relativity (STR) is widely regarded as the primary threat to the 
otherwise intuitive presentist worldview.  In particular, both the relativity and 
conventionality of simultaneity within STR appear to undermine presentism and support 
eternalism.  However, these classic arguments merely establish the mutual independence 
of the relevant concepts of simultaneity.  The subsequent debate hinges on whether 
presentism or eternalism best accounts for the principle of relativity.  It is demonstrated 
that the presentist may obtain the principle of relativity by simply prohibiting 
instantaneous signals between distant events.  Many common objections to the presentist 
Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of STR are answered in light of this demonstration.  
Therefore, one is free to choose between presentism and eternalism for some reason other 
than STR.  
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5  The Man on the Street and Presentism 
1 Introduction 
At first glance, the world appears to be three-dimensional since self-consciousness is 
limited to the present moment.  Natural emotional responses to past, present, and future 
events generally differ.
2
  Putnam suggests that the man on the street regards his 
experience as evidence for presentism ([1967]), the view that only the present exists.
3
  
Indeed, Scherr et al. find that physics students generally maintain their belief in absolute 
simultaneity despite having received instruction to the contrary ([2001], [2002]).  Of 
course, personal experience is not infallible.  Given decisive evidence, one ought to part 
with false conclusions based on illusory sense perceptions.
4
  For many, the special theory 
of relativity (STR) provides sufficient grounds to justify abandoning presentism in favour 
of eternalism, the view that the past, present, and future enjoy equal ontological status.   
For example, Putnam ([1967]) and Weingard ([1972]) have argued, respectively, 
that the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity each entail eternalism over 
presentism.  These two classic arguments are examined in Section 2 and are shown to 
hinge on a dubious identification of three feasibly independent concepts of simultaneity.  
In fact, the absolute present must be independent of any (relative or conventional) present 
proposed by STR, either by virtue of its non-existence or its invisibility.  The subsequent 
debate hinges on whether presentism or eternalism best accounts for the principle of 
relativity, namely the concealed nature of the absolute present. 
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 For a review of these first impressions, see for example (Craig [2001], pp. 129-44). 
3
 Specifically, Putnam writes that ‘All (and only) things that exist now are real. Future things (which do not 
already exist) are not real (on this view); although, of course they will be real when the appropriate time 
has come to be the present time. Similarly, past things (which have ceased to exist) are not real, although 
they were real in the past’([1967]).   
4
 Craig argues that the reality of temporal becoming is a properly basic belief potentially strong enough to 
serve as an intrinsic defeater-defeater ([2001], p. 143). 
Naturally, the eternalist requires the presentist to account for the hidden character 
off the absolute present, an entity that simply does not exist given eternalism.  For 
example, Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) contrast the apparent complexity of Craig’s 
presentist interpretation of STR with the apparent simplicity of the eternalist Minkowski 
space-time interpretation.  Generally speaking, the presentist stands accused of relying on 
too many physical postulates to support a presentist worldview.  Supposedly, the 
eternalist need not pay the same price.  
This eternalist challenge is addressed in Section 3.  By merely prohibiting distant 
instantaneous signalling in absolute space, the presentist may obtain a robust constructive 
theory.  The proposed model accounts for both the principle of relativity and its wide 
application to all field theories identified with conservation laws.  In Section 4, Craig’s 
presentist Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of STR is placed within the constructive theory 
of Section 3.  This provides that interpretation with feasible postulates and answers the 
criticism that STR is more than just an electromagnetic theory.   
Lastly, the eternalist tends to assign the burden of proof to the presentist by 
erecting a partition between experimental evidence (provided by STR) and human 
experience.  This partition is briefly examined in Section 5 and shown to be unnecessary 
given that STR clearly fails to rule between presentism and eternalism.  Therefore, 
human experience cannot be easily dismissed on the basis of STR; the existence of a 
doubly hidden absolute present remains both a rational and useful inference.   
2 The Relativity and Conventionality of Simultaneity 
2.1 Two Classic Arguments from STR 
The first major argument against presentism, driven by the authority of STR, is Putnam’s 
([1967]) argument from the relativity of simultaneity.  This approach is summarized in 
(Savitt [2000]; Bourne [2004]; Craig [2008]; Callender [2008]), to name a few.  
Interestingly, students at all levels are initially unconvinced by this argument and tend to 
instead ‘construct a conceptual framework in which the ideas of absolute simultaneity 
and the relativity of simultaneity co-exist’(Scherr et al. [2002]).  I provide an abridged 
summary of the argument below, supposing throughout that observer A exists presently: 
(1) Only the present exists. 
(2) B exists if and only if A and B are simultaneous. 
(3) Simultaneity is relative to an observer’s motion. 
(4) B’s existence depends on the motion of A. 
Premise (1) is a simple summary of the presentist worldview.  Premise (2) provides the 
term ‘simultaneous’ with the metaphysical content of mutual present existence.  As 
defined, the conjunction of (1) and (2) implies that the present contains a set of 
simultaneous events.  Premise (3) represents the relativity of simultaneity according to 
STR.  The conclusion (4) follows from the premises.  By identifying ‘simultaneity’ in (3) 
with ‘simultaneous’ in (2), one must choose between keeping (1) and avoiding (4).  A 
Minkowski space-time diagram often accompanies this argument.
5
  If the space and time 
axes are held orthogonal (in Minkowski space-time
6), then observer A’s velocity 
determines the orientation of both the time and space axes.  B only exists on A’s spatial 
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 See for example Figure 2.1 in (Callender [2008]). 
6
 On a Minkowski space-time diagram, orthogonal axes are only drawn at 90-degrees if they represent the 
current frame of reference.  Otherwise, they are drawn at an acute angle bisected by the 45-degree speed of 
light line.   
axis for a specific A velocity.  If the present is identified with the orthogonal spatial 
coordinate axes, then present existence clearly depends on observer motion.   
 The second argument against presentism driven by the authority of STR is based 
on the conventionality of simultaneity.  First raised by Weingard ([1972]) and also 
presented by Petkov ([1989]), this argument is similar to the previous one, substituting 
(3) and (4) with the following additional propositions: 
(5) Distant simultaneity is a matter of convention. 
(6) If B is distant from A, then the existence of B is a matter of convention. 
Proposition (5) is motivated by the impossible task of measuring the one-way speed of 
light without first choosing a coordinate synchronization scheme (see for example 
Winnie [1970a], [1970b]; Ungar [1986]; Sonego and Pin [2009]).  If the ‘simultaneous’ 
of (2) is identified with the ‘simultaneity’ of (5), then the conclusion (6) follows logically 
from premises (1), (2), and (5).  The presentist must abandon (1) or concede the truth of 
(6).  
The two arguments presented above have many variations.  They generally aim to 
prove the absurdity of presentism by compelling the presentist to either reject presentism 
or accept that the existence of distant reality is observer dependent.  However, the term 
‘simultaneous’ has been used above to represent three potentially independent concepts.  
Indeed, STR already maintains that the ‘simultaneity’ of (3) is distinct from the 
‘simultaneity’ of (5).  Therefore, at best only one of the two arguments can go through.  If 
these three concepts are indeed independent, then neither argument is cogent.  These 
three concepts are outlined below.   
2.2 A Shared Conclusion 
First, ‘standard simultaneity’ (SS) is a well-defined relation within STR.  Malament 
([1977]) has proven that Minkowski space-time provides a unique synchronization of 
distant clocks: orthogonal four-dimensional coordinates with the time axis tangential to 
the observer’s worldline.  The concept of orthogonal coordinates requires the use of a 
diagonal metric, which Minkowski space-time supplies.  Both the Einstein 
synchronization convention and slow clock transport produce standard simultaneity 
relations (Mansouri and Sexl [1977]).  Any synchronization method leading to standard 
simultaneity may be referred to as an ‘internal synchronization of clocks’ (Mansouri and 
Sexl [1977]).  The term ‘relativity of simultaneity’ refers to the fact that observer motion 
determines which distant events stand in a standard simultaneity relation with respect to 
the observer.   
Second, ‘coordinate simultaneity’ (CS) is a coordinate dependent relation between 
events on a four-dimensional manifold.  If two events share the same time coordinate 
value in a given coordinate system, then they are coordinate-simultaneous with respect to 
that coordinate system.  Standard simultaneity is simply coordinate simultaneity with the 
addition requirement that the coordinates are orthogonal according to the diagonal 
Minkowski metric.  Through an ‘external synchronization of clocks’ one observer may 
adopt the coordinate simultaneity of another observer in relative motion (Mansouri and 
Sexl [1977]).  This will inevitably lead to non-orthogonal coordinates.  The freedom to 
use either orthogonal or non-orthogonal coordinates is commonly referred to as the 
‘conventionality of simultaneity’.7   
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 The conventionality of simultaneity has been heavily debated, with (Malament [1977]) playing a key role.  
See (Grünbaum [2010]) for a rebuttal.  For the purpose of this paper, conventionality simply refers to the 
freedom to use non-orthogonal coordinates, as demonstrated in (Ungar [1986]).   
Third, ‘absolute simultaneity’ (AS), is the presentist metaphysical relation 
between two existing events.  In principle, one could design a coordinate system in which 
coordinate and absolute simultaneity coincide.
8
  Indeed, if an observer were at absolute 
rest, standard simultaneity would coincide with absolute simultaneity.  The validity of 
presentism is tied to the existence of the absolute simultaneity relation.   
For the purpose of this discussion, a frame of reference for a given observer is a 
special coordinate system in which the spatial location of the observer is regarded as a 
constant.  A frame of reference may use either SS or CS coordinates depending on 
whether the coordinate system is orthogonal relative to the Minkowski metric.  Naturally, 
if an observer is in absolute motion, SS and AS relations will not coincide.  However, the 
observer is still free to choose a coordinate system in which CS and AS relations coincide 
through an external synchronization of clocks.   
In light of this classification of concepts, we may amend premises (2), (3), and (5) 
as follows: 
(2’) B exists if and only if A and B are absolutely simultaneous. 
(3’) Standard simultaneity is relative to an observer’s motion. 
(5’)  Distant coordinate simultaneity is a matter of convention. 
Premises (1), (2’), and (3’) do not imply (4) unless absolute simultaneity is identified 
with standard simultaneity.  Premises (1), (2’), and (5’) do not imply (6) unless absolute 
simultaneity is identified with coordinate simultaneity.  Therefore, to avoid (4) and (6), 
an undesirable observer-dependent reality, the presentist and eternalist may agree that: 
(7) If absolute simultaneity relations exist, then they are independent of both 
standard and coordinate simultaneity relations. 
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 Namely, the entire present consisting of all existing events may be indexed by three linearly independent 
spatial variables.  A fourth variable would be used to denote time as the absolute present evolves.  
 Note that STR does not forbid SS and CS relations from coinciding within a given 
frame of reference.  Similarly, (7) does not forbid AS relations from coinciding with a 
particular choice of CS or SS relations.  Independence simply ensures that the 
coincidence represents a special case rather than a fundamental connection between 
concepts.
9
  Although the presentist and eternalist are opposed concerning (1), they may 
agree about (7).  
3 A Presentist Interpretation of STR 
Having identified the common ground shared by the presentist and eternalist, the debate 
shifts towards who can best explain the principle of relativity.  The task for the presentist 
is to either identify the absolute present or clearly demonstrate why that task is 
impossible.  The eternalist argues that it is impossible to identify the absolute present 
within STR simply because it does not exist; all events are equally real.  Relativistic 
phenomena, such as length contraction and clock retardation, are regarded as best 
explained by the structure of an existing four-dimensional Minkowski space-time 
(Balashov and Janssen [2003]; Petkov [2007]; Norton [2008]).  Furthermore, the success 
of modern relativistic field theory developed within Minkowski space-time seems to 
justify the eternalist position.  On the other hand, the presentist seems compelled to hold 
that the absolute present is hidden from observation due to the electromagnetic physical 
effects of Lorentz contraction and clock retardation.  As a result, presentism stands 
accused of postulating the Lorentz covariance of all remaining physical field theories ad 
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 In this paper I am interested in whether such a special case could plausibly exist.  I therefore limit the 
discussion to ‘surface’ presentism.  Hinchliff ([2000]) notes that the presentist may adopt a point, cone, or 
surface model of the present.  The other two options for the presentist are much less appealing.  The point 
model fails to explain the supposed existence of distant reality.  The cone model has some bizarre 
properties, such as regarding the emission of the cosmic microwave background radiation in the early 
universe as simultaneous with modern observers (Savitt [2000]).   
hoc in order to hide the absolute present from the observer (Balashov and Janssen 
[2003]).  Indeed, many presentists feel compelled to look outside of STR at quantum 
mechanical or general relativistic arguments for the existence of the absolute present 
(Bourne [2004]; Callender [2008]).  Nonetheless, there remain good reasons to maintain 
the existence of an unobservable distant absolute present within STR. 
3.1 Theories of Principle and Constructive Theories 
Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) hold that if STR is regarded strictly as a theory of 
principle, then it does not reveal the ontology of space and time.  Rather, if certain 
postulates hold true in a given world, then their implications will also hold true in that 
world.  As a theory of principle, STR rests on two postulates: 
(8) There are no (ontologically) preferred inertial observers.10 
(9) The speed of light is isotropic and independent of both observer and source 
motion.
11
 
 
Of course, these postulates are not conversely proven by the verification of their 
experimental implications.  Constructive theories of relativity,
12
 however, may be built 
upon various three-dimensional presentist or four-dimensional eternalist ontologies, 
provided that the proposed model explains the relevant experimental evidence (Balashov 
and Janssen [2003]).  One such presentist theory, the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation 
(Craig [2008]), is often criticized on two counts.  First, Balashov and Janssen regard the 
theory as ‘triply-amended’ ([2003]), requiring too many postulates and resulting in too 
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 There are a variety of ways to express this principle.  For the eternalist, no preferred observer exists since 
no absolute space exists to pick out a single ignorant preferred observer; there are no ontologically 
preferred inertial observers.  Generally, the presentist would state that no preferred observer has objective 
knowledge of being at rest in absolute space; there are no epistemically preferred inertial observers.   
11
 This postulate is often misunderstood.  For clarification, see (Baierlein [2006]). 
12
 The term ‘constructive theory’ is used here in the sense described by Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) and 
not necessarily in the sense described by Norton ([2008]).  The debate between presentism and eternalism 
addressed here is not simply a debate between the relational and substantival positions. 
few useful implications.  As a result, the principle of relativity is implicitly postulated 
rather than explained.  Secondly, the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation appears to say little 
about non-electromagnetic phenomena, thereby ceding credibility to Minkowski space-
time as a common origin for all relativistic effects (Balashov and Janssen [2003]; Norton 
[2008]).  It seems that the task of the presentist is to build a constructive model that 
explains, rather than postulates, both the principle of relativity and its application to non-
electromagnetic systems.  In what follows, the existence of the absolute present (and 
therefore absolute space) is assumed and a prohibition against instantaneous signalling is 
postulated.  The relativity principle, namely the prohibition against detecting motion 
through absolute space, is shown to follow from these postulates.   
3.2 Epistemic Content of Observation 
The light speed postulate of STR, represented by premise (9), places firm limits on 
objective knowledge of the world by denying the observer immediate awareness of 
distant events.  However, the key implications of (9) are not due to light speed isotropy or 
the agreement between various observers about the one-way speed of light.
13
  Stripping 
(9) of these requirements, we consider the following revised postulate:   
 (9’) Distant instantaneous physical signalling or communication is prohibited. 
Both human experience and experimental evidence confirm this prohibition.  The 
potential exception involves entangled quantum particles.  However, it is clear that these 
theoretically instantaneous signals are of no use for communication (Callender [2008]). 
As a result, the distant present is effectively invisible.  The present is only experienced 
                                                 
13
 Ungar  ([1986]) has provided a transformation group that leaves the anisotropic speed of light constant 
yet reduces to the Lorentz group in the isotropic case. Therefore, observers may use different light speed 
conventions without sacrificing the group structure associated with the principle of relativity.  Of course, 
transformations from the isotropic Lorentz group to Ungar’s anisotropic group neither constitute a group 
nor violate the principle of relativity (Selleri [2005]). 
locally; observations of distant events are always observations of the past.  Therefore, 
only local observations made at one’s current location contribute to one’s direct 
knowledge of the absolute present.   
What about indirect knowledge?  Premise (9’) immediately suggests an 
interesting distinction between perception and observation, first suggested by Terrell 
([1959]).
14
  The following definitions apply for the purpose of this discussion.  A 
perception is the present local awareness of any number of simultaneously received 
signals.  Each signal conveys information about its source’s past, while the presently 
existing source remains hidden.  On the other hand, an observation consists of placing 
perceived data into a three-dimensional model that accounts for the simultaneous 
emission and original locations of the multiple signals perceived.  Signal perception may 
be considered a local observation of the signal itself since it is independent of both 
perceiver motion and distant coordinate simultaneity.  
To illuminate these definitions with an example from STR, consider a photograph 
taken of an object flying past the photographer at a relativistic speed.  Terrell 
demonstrates that given STR, the Lorentz contraction is invisible to the perceiver, 
regardless of relative motion of the object and the photographer ([1959]).
15
  Of course, 
one may observe the phenomenon by using SS coordinates to calculate the nature of the 
optical illusion and remove it from the photographs (see Deissler [2005] for details).  
However, if CS coordinates are used, a different type of optical illusion will be edited out 
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 Terrell ([1959]) differentiates between seeing and observing in terms of simultaneous reception versus 
simultaneous emission of light signals.  The term ‘perceive’ is intended to extend Terrell’s ‘seeing’ to 
include non-electromagnetic signals and signals traveling at various speeds. 
15
 This result holds over small solid angles.  The observer’s field of view undergoes a conformal 
transformation resulting in image magnification proportional to the Doppler shift.  Objects appear rotated 
rather than contracted (Terrell [1959]). Nevertheless, the Lorentz contraction is not strictly perceived.  
of the picture.
16
  One photograph yields a multitude of observations, each connected to a 
specific choice of coordinate simultaneity. 
In order to form a distant observation without instantaneous signals, a frame of 
reference is required to classify the information provided by means of perception.  Since 
the frame of reference depends on both observer motion and synchrony preference (SS or 
CS relations), then the invariant component of any observation is the information 
perceived.  An observer is firstly a perceiver.  Therefore, it follows from (1) and (9’) that: 
(10) The epistemic content of observation is limited to local perceptions 
independent of coordinate simultaneity and observer motion. 
 
We now apply premise (10) to some fairly simple examples. Consider first the 
one-way velocity of light.
17
  Perceiver A is required to record the emission of a light 
signal at a local time.  Distant perceiver B is required to record the arrival of that light 
signal at a different local time.  Both perceptions count as local observations.  However, 
to combine them, the clocks of both perceivers must be synchronized.  Therefore the 
observation of the one-way velocity of light is not directly perceived and cannot become 
a synchrony-independent law.  Interestingly, when discussing light signals, one may not 
confirm the stronger condition (9) given the truth of the weaker condition (9’).  
Next, consider the process of counting distant sources.  Suppose perceiver A is 
constantly receiving signals from discrete sources within a region of finite volume.  In 
principle, a qualified perceiver could record the angular position and signal intensity of 
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 Terrell’s derivation of the invisibility of the Lorentz contraction rests solely on the Lorentz 
transformation of the spatial coordinates ([1959]).  Since it does not depend on any specific time 
transformation, this result also holds for alternate coordinate simultaneities.  Therefore, the Lorentz 
contraction is equally invisible for observers using CS and SS coordinates, in agreement with the 
conventionality of simultaneity.   
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 There is a great deal of literature on this topic as it is closely related to the conventionality of 
simultaneity.  See for example (Winnie [1970a], [1970b]; Mansouri and Sexl [1977]; Ungar [1986]; Selleri 
[2005]; Tangherlini [2009]; Sonego and Pin [2009]; Iyer and Prabhu [2010]; Grünbaum [2010]). 
each incoming signal at any given moment.  By producing successive source charts, 
analogous to star charts, perceiver A could determine that the number of observable 
sources in the region is fixed.  Subsequently, the perceiver could conclude that these 
source particles are neither created nor destroyed.  If a conservation law for source 
particles can be perceived as a local observation, then this conservation law is 
independent of simultaneity conventions.
18
  
Alternatively, an experimenter could set up a laboratory suitably equipped with 
instruments to locally detect the presence of signal sources.  In order to record the times 
and locations of each local detection, the detector locations must be indexed using a 
laboratory spatial coordinate system.  Next, the clocks on each detector must be 
synchronized in a suitable manner.  Both internal and external synchronization methods 
are permitted.  The main criterion for clock synchronization is that the 0t  index moves 
faster than the sources through the laboratory in absolute space, in order to avoid 
counting a source twice.  At any moment, as defined by the chosen coordinate 
simultaneity convention, the experimenter could count the number sources detected 
within the laboratory.  Re-synchronizing the detector clocks according to a different CS 
relation, the experimenter could repeat the counting experiment.  Provided that no source 
is counted twice, and that the sources endure in time, the number of sources detected 
simultaneously is an invariant property of the system.   
In light of these examples, the argument thus far may be expressed as follows.  
On presentism (1), all that exists forms a three-dimensional manifold 0  evolving 
through time.  Provided that no particle or signal travels at an actually infinite speed (9’), 
                                                 
18
 It is assumed that the perceiver is travelling at a velocity suitable for the reception of signals from any 
angle.  This limits the perceiver to velocities less than the signal speed while making accurate perceptions. 
and therefore endures beyond the present moment, then 0 is a Cauchy surface.  A 
Cauchy surface intersects each particle and signal worldline exactly once within the 
direct product space R0 , where R is the set of real numbers.  The existence of the 
single ‘Cauchy surface’ 0  implies that R0  is diffeomorphic to ),( gM , a globally 
hyperbolic (pseudo-Reimannian) metric space (Dieckmann [1988]).  When suitably 
diagonalized, metric g reduces to the Minkowski metric   (Nakahara [2003], p. 245). 
In practice, there exist multiple CS schemes where no source or signal is counted 
twice.  Each of these corresponds to a Cauchy surface   within the metric space 
),( 0 gR .  Therefore, each space R  is also diffeomorphic to ),( gM .  If there are 
multiple Cauchy surfaces permitted by ),( gM , it is unclear which corresponds to 
absolute space 0 .  It is clear that the existence of just one Cauchy surface 0  is 
sufficient to establish that R0  is globally hyperbolic and diffeomorphic to ),( gM .  
Therefore, provided that we exclusively use CS coordinates that fit Cauchy surfaces  , 
then: 
(11) Particle conservation laws are perceivable, independent of both observer 
motion and coordinate simultaneity convention.   
 
To summarize, one may begin with presentism (1) and a prohibition against 
instantaneous signalling (9’).  One may then conclude that the epistemic content of 
observation is limited to local perceptions (10).  Any one-way non-zero velocity is not 
strictly perceivable, illustrating the conventionality of (9).  On the other hand, particle 
conservation laws are in principle perceivable and may be described using a wide range 
of suitable coordinate systems (11). Therefore,  
(12) Conservation laws obey the epistemic principle of relativity.  One may not 
use conservation laws to detect absolute motion. 
 
3.3 Presentist Covariant Field Theory 
If conservation laws obey the principle of relativity, then the field theories associated 
with each conservation law must also obey the principle of relativity.  To demonstrate 
this, one must establish a correlation between conservation laws and field theories 
without relying exclusively on the Lorentz transformation group and its preferred SS 
relations.  We therefore consider the standard variational approach used to model 
physical fields (Mills [1989] provides an excellent overview).  At the fundamental level, 
a physical system may be described using a Lagrangian density functional of both fields 
and space-time coordinates.
19
  The action is the integral of the Lagrangian with respect to 
the space-time coordinates over some region of their values.  Physical laws are 
generally
20
 taken to be configurations of the fields that leave the action unchanged under 
slight variations (adjustments) of the fields or the space-time coordinates.  
Specifically, one may obtain the conservation laws for energy and momentum by 
holding the action constant with respect to either small variations of the boundaries of the 
region of integration (Barut [1980], pp. 103-5,115), general continuous coordinate 
transformation (Barut [1980], p. 108), or small variations of the metric on a general four-
dimensional manifold (Nakahara [2003], pp. 298-300).  Put simply, energy and 
momentum conservation laws follow from one’s freedom to use alternative coordinate 
systems to describe the evolution of a physical system (Mills [1989]).  Alternatively, one 
may obtain the field equations that govern the physical fields by holding the action 
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 The Lagrangian often implicitly depends on space and time coordinates through the space and time 
dependencies of the fields.   
20
 This requires the application of Hamilton’s principle (see Mills [1989]; Brown and Holland [2004]). 
constant while varying the fields themselves (Barut [1980], pp. 99-103).  These variations 
are often referred to as internal symmetries or gauge symmetry groups (Mills [1989]).  In 
general, the mathematical identity known as Noether’s theorem correlates field theories 
to conservation laws (see for example Plybon [1971]; Al-Kuwari and Taha [1991]; 
Brown and Holland [2004]).  In summary,
21
 
(13) Energy and momentum conservation laws correspond to the freedom to 
describe a system using alternate coordinate systems. 
 
(14) Both field equations and conserved field sources correspond to the 
freedom to describe the fields using different gauges. 
 
Surprisingly, the Lorentz coordinate transformations of STR do not play a 
necessary role in either type of variation.  First, the symmetry group formed by the 
Lorentz transformations is independent of the ‘internal symmetries’ represented by the 
gauge transformation groups governing each field theory.
22
  Second, multiple symmetries 
can lead to the same conserved quantities.
23
  The Lorentz transformations are simply a 
single case of the generalized coordinate transformation that corresponds to energy and 
momentum conservation.
24
 Therefore, the claim of Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) that 
reality only corresponds to concepts that are invariant under the Lorentz group of 
transformations is unjustified.  The Lorentz group is independent of the relevant gauge 
transformation groups and does not uniquely correspond to energy and momentum 
conservation.   
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 See Table I in (Barut [1980], p. 102) for several examples of field equations due to the variation of the 
Lagrangian with respect to the fields.  Also see Table II in (Barut [1980], p. 117) for examples of both 
conserved sources and energy and momentum conservation laws due to variations of the action with respect 
to the fields and the coordinate respectively. 
22
 Gauge symmetry groups U(1), SU(2), and SU(3) exist independently of the Lorentz transformations. 
23
 In the case of internal symmetries, both global and local continuous symmetries lead to the same 
conserved values (Al-Kuwari and Taha [1991]). 
24
 Indeed, Ungar ([1986]) has demonstrated that the Lorentz transformation group itself can be generalized 
to account for anisotropic simultaneity conventions. 
Experiment is required to determine which field theory corresponds to which 
conservation law.
25
  Since conservation laws obey the principle of relativity (12), it 
follows that the corresponding field theory may be constructed in any coordinate system 
in which the conservation law holds, not solely frames of reference connected by Lorentz 
transformations.  Therefore, it follows from (12), (13), and (14) that: 
(15) If a conservation law obeys the principle of relativity, then the 
corresponding field theory also obeys the principle of relativity. 
 
 In light of this argument, it is clear that the presentist is not obligated to detect the 
distant present given that it is doubly hidden by the finite signal speed restriction (9’).  
First, signals of finite speed do not permit the perception of distant present events.  
Second, conservation laws may be perceived by inferring the number of presently 
existing sources from the number of perceived signals.  This procedure is independent of 
one’s choice of coordinate simultaneity convention.  Using variational calculus, 
Noether’s theorem, and experiment, a field theory may be assigned to each conservation 
law, regardless of coordinate choice.  As a result, the observer will not observe any 
deviations from the expected absolute frame field theory in a moving frame of reference.  
Therefore, given presentism (1) and the prohibition against instantaneous signals (9’), it 
follows that: 
(8’) There are no (epistemically) preferred inertial observers. 
4 Objections Concerning the Neo-Lorentzian Interpretation 
Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) raise at least two major objections against the presentist 
Neo-Lorentzian interpretation of STR, both of which relate to the principle of relativity.  
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 Two Lagrangians will yield the same physical laws if their difference is simply a gradient with respect to 
the independent variables, namely the space and time coordinates (Barut [1980], p. 101; Brown and 
Holland [2004]). 
First, the presentist relies on too many postulates to obtain the Lorentz covariance of 
electromagnetic phenomena.  Second, the presentist fails to explain the Lorentz 
covariance of non-electromagnetic phenomena.  One may answer both objections by 
connecting the Neo-Lorentzian interpretation to the model presented in Section 3.  
Concerning the second objection, the constructive field theory developed above may be 
considered a generalized version of the primarily electromagnetic Neo-Lorentzian 
interpretation.  Having perceived conservation of electric charge, one may experimentally 
rule out all potential Lagrangians furnished by Noether’s theorem that do not yield 
Maxwell’s equations and the Lorentz force law.  It is clear from the discussion above that 
any field theory that may be developed using a Lagrangian and the variational approach 
fits within the presentist worldview.  The Neo-Lorentzian interpretation merely considers 
electromagnetism, an Abelian gauge theory.  Non-Abelian gauge theories rely on the 
same mathematical structure and may in principle be treated in an analogous fashion (see 
for example Al-Kuwari and Taha [1991]), without recourse to eternalism. 
 We now consider the first objection and specifically examine the electromagnetic 
case.  Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) claim that the Neo-Lorentzian theory is ‘triply 
amended’; it posits unnecessary structure to reality in order to obtain the relativity 
principle.  In particular, they accuse the presentist, specifically the Neo-Lorentzian, of 
assuming Newtonian mechanics, Maxwell’s electrodynamics, Lorentz contraction, clock 
retardation, standard simultaneity relations, and ultimately the Lorentz covariance of all 
non-electromagnetic field theories in order to explain the experimental data supporting 
the principle of relativity ([2003]).   
By way of an overall response, it is clear from Section 3 that the Neo-Lorentzian 
interpretation can be firmly grounded in presentism (1) and the reality of the prohibition 
against instantaneous distant signals (9’).  It is up to experiment to determine whether the 
conserved charge observed is indeed electric or part of a different field theory.  
Furthermore, the theory criticized in (Balashov and Janssen [2003]) need not depend on 
such a wide range of postulates.  Concerning the number of postulates, Erlichson ([1973]) 
provides a historical overview of the postulates and implications of the ‘Lorentz Theory 
A’ (LTA), ‘Lorentz Theory B’ (LTB), and STR.   It seems that Balashov and Janssen 
([2003]) level their criticism against a combination of LTA and LTB, thereby supposing 
that the presentist must adopt the postulates of both models.  However, the LTA 
postulates an ether, rod contraction, and clock retardation; it then derives the Lorentz 
transformations and the relativity principle as a result.  The LTB postulates an ether and 
the covariance of Maxwell’s equations; it then derives the Lorentz transformations, rod 
contraction, and clock retardation (Erlichson [1973]).  The presentist isn’t committed to 
assuming the postulates of both the LTA and the LTB.  Rather one is free to assume the 
postulates of the LTA, the LTB, or potentially (1) and (9’) as discussed above. 
Specific responses are also in order concerning the use of Newtonian mechanics 
and standard simultaneity relations.  First, Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) criticize the 
Neo-Lorentzian interpretation for adopting Newtonian mechanics.  Perhaps this objection 
follows from the false dilemma raised between the Galilean covariance of Newtonian 
mechanics and the Lorentz covariance of Maxwell’s equations (see Tangherlini [2009] 26 
for a detailed examination of this issue).  Since these two symmetry groups differ 
concerning the relativity of simultaneity (Baierlein [2006]), and the Lorentz group has 
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 Tangherlini’s 1958 dissertation was recently made available as ([2009]). 
greater experimental confirmation, one might suppose that simultaneity must be relative.  
However, the absolute Lorentz transformations (ALT) first developed by Tangherlini 
([2009]), and further discussed in (Mansouri and Sexl [1977]; Selleri [2005]; Iyer and 
Prabhu [2010]), satisfy the experimental data while conserving simultaneity relations.  
This approach is particularly useful when considering accelerating systems (Selleri 
[2008]).  Using Tangherlini’s mechanics, objects with mass cannot be accelerated beyond 
the speed of light, in agreement with STR (Tangherlini [2009]).  The essential difference 
between Tangherlini’s ALT transformations and STR lays in the freedom to use CS 
rather than solely SS relations.  Furthermore, in light of (13), energy and momentum 
conservation is not violated by the use of alternative coordinate systems.  As with the 
one-way velocity of light, the relativity of simultaneity is not part of the epistemic 
content of observational physics. 
Second, the Neo-Lorentzian is criticized for using standard simultaneity rather 
than absolute simultaneity relations between events (Balashov and Janssen [2003]).  In 
light of the discussion in Section 3, is seems that this criticism is generally unwarranted.  
Since the absolute present is out of epistemic reach, the presentist is free to regard the 
one-way speed of light as isotropic by convention.  Clearly, the corresponding SS 
relations are the simplest.  However, the presentist may wish to use CS rather than SS 
relations.  In this case, Maxwell’s equations would simply adopt their macroscopic form 
within a non-linear electrically polarized medium, thereby allowing for anisotropic light 
propagation by convention.  This hardly constitutes a violation of the principle of 
relativity; namely, the absolute present is not revealed.  Therefore, the use of SS relations 
is not required to uphold the principle of relativity.   
Nonetheless, Balashov and Janssen ([2003]) suggest that the SS scheme is 
preferred since it may be obtained using either light signals or bullets to synchronized 
distant clocks.  In doing so, they assume that if a specific amount of kinetic energy is 
imparted to a projectile of fixed rest mass, then the one-way velocity will be independent 
of the direction of projectile motion.
27
  Thought experiments of this sort are criticized by 
Ungar ([1988]) for presupposing the absence of the very anisotropic effects that they 
intend to rule out.  The concept of an observed one-way velocity is meaningless without 
first adopting a synchronization convention.  The use of CS relations does not constitute a 
violation of the principle of relativity (see Ungar [1986]; Selleri [2005]).  Rather, CS 
relations provide an alternate framework within which to make experimental 
observations.   
To summarize, the presentist is not restricted to merely modeling electromagnetic 
phenomena.  Furthermore, the presentist need not assume the combined postulates of the 
LTA and the LTB, Newtonian mechanics, or SS relations.  The LTA, LTB, and the 
model in Section 3 each provide a simple set of postulates and serve as constructive 
theories to be assessed individually.  The presentist is not committed to Newtonian 
mechanics in order to retain absolute simultaneity.  Rather, the presentist simply requires 
that the relativity of simultaneity does not constitute an experimentally proven fact.  As a 
result, the presentist is free to use CS or SS relations as desired.  Any dynamical 
experiment will not yield isotropic results if non-standard CS coordinates are used.  This 
is an artefact of the coordinate system just as SS coordinates are characterized by spatial 
isotropy (Ungar [1986]; Sonego and Pin [2009]). 
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 Regarding the dynamics of particles without assuming isotropic light propagation, see (Selleri [1996]; 
Sonego and Pin [2009]). 
5 The Man on the Street and Presentism 
We now return to Putnam’s ([1967]) man on the street, having carefully considered the 
implications that presentism ought to have for physics.  It seems that for the man on the 
street the burden of proof lies squarely with the eternalist; human experience demands an 
explanation.  The eternalist must therefore erect a partition between experimental 
evidence and human experience.  For example, Callender writes ([2000]): 
‘Here I can only ask, if science cannot find the 'becoming frame', what 
extra-scientific reason is there for positing it? If the answer is our 
experience of becoming, we are essentially stating that our brains 
somehow have access to a global feature of the world that no experiment 
can detect. This is rather spooky.’ 
 
Savitt ([2000]) similarly suggests that ‘If the present is indeed so elusive, I find it difficult 
to imagine what aid or comfort it could be to a metaphysician.’ In so far as STR conflicts 
with human experience, it seems quite reasonable to prefer experimental evidence.  
However, since STR does not rule between presentism and eternalism, it seems 
unnecessary to regard human experience as misleading.   
 As demonstrated above, the two classic arguments against presentism based on 
the relativity and conventionality of simultaneity do not obtain without forcing a 
connection between the relative, conventional, and absolute present.  Therefore, the 
absolute present of human experience is independent of the two major notions of the 
present in STR.  The subsequent debate hinges on who can provide a satisfactory 
explanation for the principle of relativity.  Fortunately for the presentist, the principle of 
relativity is not postulated ad hoc; it follows naturally from the absence of instantaneous 
signals.  It is clear that the absolute present is doubly hidden as a result.  First, distant 
observations are always observations of the past.  Second, conservation laws are 
perceivable independently of both synchrony and motion.  The field theories correlated to 
conservation laws are similarly coordinate independent; rather they depend on the 
variations and internal symmetries of the fields themselves.  Therefore, the belief that an 
absolute present ought to yield experimental or theoretical results different from those of 
eternalist Minkowski space-time is unwarranted.   
 Given this model, it is unclear whether eternalism remains simpler than 
presentism.  The epistemic principle or relativity (8’) rests on humble postulates yet is 
applicable to any field theory correlated to a conservation law, not only electromagnetic 
phenomena.  Against the eternalist charge that an absolute present adds extra structure to 
Minkowski space-time, the presentist may rightly reply that Minkowski space-time adds 
extra ontology to the absolute present (Crisp [2008]).  It seems then that the eternalist 
partition between experimental evidence and human experience cannot be supported by 
the relativity or conventionality of simultaneity, the origin of the principle of relativity, or 
the apparent complexity of the presentist model.   
Why then is science impotent to detect that which cannot be divorced from human 
experience?  One potential response to Callender ([2000]) and Savitt ([2000]) may be 
sketched as follows.  Each person experiences the absolute present locally.  By assuming 
that others have similar experiences, at distant locations, one may infer the existence of 
the distant absolute present.  However, since the distant absolute present is doubly 
hidden, one is clearly unable to pinpoint absolute simultaneity.  Therefore, the brain does 
not strictly detect distant absolute simultaneity; STR and human experience are in 
agreement in this respect.  As a result, the partition erected between human experience 
and experimental evidence is unnecessary.  Therefore, one is free to choose between 
presentism and eternalism for some reason other than STR. 
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